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Abstract
The problem of providing privacy, in the private information retrieval (PIR) sense, to users requesting
data from a distributed storage system (DSS), is considered. The DSS is coded by an (n, k, d) Maximum
Distance Separable (MDS) code to store the data reliably on unreliable storage nodes. Some of these
nodes can be spies which report to a third party, such as an oppressive regime, which data is being
requested by the user. An information theoretic PIR scheme ensures that a user can satisfy its request
while revealing no information on which data is being requested to the nodes. A user can trivially achieve
PIR by downloading all the data in the DSS. However, this is not a feasible solution due to its high
communication cost. We construct PIR schemes with low download communication cost. When there is
b = 1 spy node in the DSS, in other words, no collusion between the nodes, we construct PIR schemes
with download cost 1
1−R
per unit of requested data (R = k/n is the code rate), achieving the information
theoretic limit for linear schemes. The proposed schemes are universal since they depend on the code
rate, but not on the generator matrix of the code. Also, if b ≤ n − δk nodes collude, with δ = ⌊n−b
k
⌋,
we construct linear PIR schemes with download cost b+δk
δ
.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following scenario. A group of online peers (storage nodes) want to collaborate together
to form a peer-to-peer (p2p) distributed storage system (DSS) to store and share files reliably, while
ensuring information theoretic private information retrieval (PIR). The PIR [2], [3] property allows a user
(possibly one of the peers) to download a file while revealing no information about which file is being
downloaded. We are mainly motivated by the following two applications: 1) A DSS that protects users
from surveillance and monitoring, for instance from an oppressive regime. The people (peers) collectively
contribute to storing the data and making it pervasively available online. But, some peers could be spies
for the regime. They could turn against their “neighbors” and report to the oppressor the identity of
users accessing some information deemed to be anti-regime (blogs, photos, videos, etc.), leading to their
persecution; 2) A DSS that protects the personal information of users, such as gender, age group, disease,
etc., which can be inferred from their file access history. This information can potentially be used to target
them with unwanted advertisement, or even affect them adversarially in other areas, such as applications
to health insurance or bank loans. In this respect, the studied DSS can provide an infrastructure, at least
in theory, over which applications, such as cloud storage and social networking, can be run with a privacy
guarantee for the users.
We suppose the DSS is formed of n peers or nodes. Peers can be temporarily offline or can leave
the system at any time. The data is stored redundantly in the system to guarantee its durability and
availability. We assume that the DSS uses an (n, k, d) maximum distance separable (MDS) code that can
tolerate n− k simultaneous node failures. A certain number of nodes in the DSS, say b, whose identities
are unknown to the users or the system, are spies that collude and can report the user requests to the
oppressor, or sell this information to interested third parties. The user can always achieve PIR by asking
to download all the files in the DSS. However, this solution is not feasible due to its high communication
cost, and more efficient solutions have been studied in the PIR literature [4]–[10] assuming the data is
replicated in the system. The next example illustrates our PIR scheme with efficient communication cost
that can be run on MDS coded data.
Example 1. Consider a DSS formed of n = 4 nodes, as shown in Figure 1, that stores m files
(ai, bi), ai, bi ∈ GF (3
w), i = 1, 2, . . . ,m. The DSS is coded by an (n, k, d) = (4, 2, 3) MDS code over
GF (3) to store the files. Nodes 1, . . . , 4 store, respectively, ai, bi, ai + bi, ai+2bi, i = 1, . . . ,m. Suppose
the user is interested in retrieving file f , i.e., (af , bf ), which can equally likely be any of the m files. To
this end, the user generates a random vector u = (u1, . . . , um) with components chosen independently
and uniformly at random from the underlying base field GF (3). It sends the query vector q = u to nodes
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Fig. 1: The user sends queries as specified in Example 1 and receives the responses. From the responses, the user
can decode af and bf , thus decoding the desired file privately.
1 and 2 and q = u+ ef to nodes 3 and 4, where ef is the all zero vector of length m with a 1 in the
f th entry. Upon receiving the user’s request, each node in the DSS returns to the user the projection of
all its data on the received query vector. For instance, suppose that the user wants file 1. Then, nodes
1, . . . , 4 return the following symbols from GF (3w), I1, I2, af + bf + I1+ I2, af +2bf + I1 +2I2, where
I1 =
∑m
i=1 uiai and I2 =
∑m
i=1 uibi are thought of as “interference” terms. The returned information
forms an invertible linear system and the user can decode af and bf . Assume that the DSS contains
no colluding nodes, i.e. b = 1. Then, the proposed scheme achieves PIR since the query vector to each
node is statistically independent of the file index f . However, if a node, say node 1, knows the query
vector of another node, say node 3, it may be able to pin down which file the user wanted, by computing
ef = q− u. However, we assume that a node does not have access to the queries coming to any other
nodes, and PIR is indeed achieved here. This PIR scheme downloads 4 symbols to retrieve a file of size
2 symbols. We say that the communication price of privacy cPoP = 4/2 = 2 for this scheme, which
does not depend on the number of files in the system.
Replication-based PIR: PIR was first introduced in the seminal papers of Chor et al. in [2], [3] followed
by a significant amount of research in this area [4]–[8], [11], [12]. The classical model considers a
binary database of length m and a user that wishes to privately retrieve the value of a bit (a record)
in it, while minimizing the total communication cost including the upload (query) and download phase.
Chor et al. [3] showed that if there is one server storing the database, the user has to download the
whole database in order to achieve information theoretic PIR. However, when the database is replicated
on n non-colluding (non-cooperating) servers (nodes), they devised a PIR scheme with total, upload and
download, communication cost of O((n2 log n)m1/n) and O(m1/3) for the special case of n = 2. In the
past few years, there has been significant progress in developing PIR protocols with total communication
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4cost that is subpolynomial in the size of the database [11]–[13]. Moreover, a connection between PIR
and blind interference alignment was discussed in [14]. PIR in a computational sense was shown to be
achievable with a single server (no replication) in [15] assuming the hardness of quadratic residuosity
problem. PIR schemes on databases that are replicated but not perfectly synchronized were studied in
[16].
Coded PIR: The original model studied in PIR assumes that the entire data is replicated on each node.
PIR on coded data was studied in the literature on Batch Codes [17], where the data is coded to allow
parallel processing leading to amortizing the PIR communication cost over multiple retrievals. Recently,
the PIR problem in DSSs that use erasure codes was initiated in [9], where it was shown that one
extra bit of download is sufficient to achieve PIR assuming the number of servers n to be exponential
in the number of files. Bounds on the information theoretic tradeoff between storage and download
communication cost for coded DSSs, for arbitrary number of files m, were derived in [10]. The setting
when nodes can be byzantine (malicious) was considered in [18] and robust PIR schemes were devised
using locally decodable codes. Robust PIR was also studied in [19], [20]. In [21], methods for transforming
a replication-based PIR scheme into a coded-based PIR scheme with the same communication cost, up
to a multiplicative constant, were studied. PIR array codes with optimal rate were designed in [22].
Following this work in [1], [23], the lowest achievable price of privacy for repetition code on n nodes
having m files and b colluding nodes was found in [24], [25] to be 1−(b/n)
m
1−(b/n) and that of an (n, k)-code
was found in [26] to be
1−(k/n)m
1−(k/n) . Also, schemes using GRS codes have been constructed in [27], and
they conjectured that the lowest achievable price of privacy is
1−( b+k−1
n
)m
1− b+k−1
n
. That conjecture was then
disproved using a counter example in [28]. Moreover, in [29], PIR on coded data such that arbitrary sets
of servers collude is studied. In [30], PIR schemes for any arbitrary code were discussed. Some work
was also done on symmetric PIR, where the objective is to not only protect the privacy of the user, but
also the privacy of the server, such that the user should not get information about files other than the
one he wants [31]. Also, the capacity of byzantine PIR on replicated storage systems was found in [32].
Contributions: Motivated by the two DSS applications mentioned earlier, we draw the following distinc-
tions with the previous literature prior to this work on coded PIR [1]: (i) To the best of our knowledge,
all the previous work on coded PIR, except for [10], assumes that the code is used to encode together
data from different files (records). However, the model here is different, since in DSS applications only
data chunks belonging to the same file are encoded together (as done in Example 1); (ii) The work in
[10] studies fundamental limits on the costs of coded PIR. Here, we provide explicit constructions of
PIR schemes with efficient communication cost.
In comparison with the classical literature on replication-based PIR, we make the following observa-
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5tions: (i) We focus only on the number of downloaded symbols in the communication cost of a PIR
scheme. This is since the upload query matrices are dependent only on the number of files and not on
the size of the file, and typically in DSSs, the size of a file is relatively larger than the total number of
files.; (ii) Up to b nodes may collude and share their queries in the hope of determining the requested
file.
In the model we study, we assume that the MDS code parameters (n, k, d) are given and depend on
the desired reliability level for the data. Therefore, they are not design parameters that can be chosen
to optimize the efficiency of the PIR scheme. However, the code itself may have to be designed jointly
with the PIR scheme. A PIR scheme incurs many overheads on the DSS, including communication cost,
computations [7], and connectivity; user contacts n instead of k nodes, as seen in Example 1. However,
we measure here the efficiency of a PIR scheme only by its total download communication cost, which
we refer to as the communication Price of Privacy (cPoP). A more formal definition of cPoP is given in
Definition 3 after the model we use has been established. The PIR rate is the inverse of the cPoP , i.e. the
data downloaded from the required file per downloaded symbol. The following questions naturally arise
here: (1) What is the minimum achievable cPoP for given n, k and b? (2) How to efficiently construct
codes and PIR schemes that achieve optimal cPoP? (3) Do the code and PIR scheme have to be designed
jointly to achieve optimum cPoP? The last question addresses the problem of whether reliability and PIR
could be addressed separately in a DSS. Moreover, it may have practical implications on whether data
already existing in coded form needs to be re-encoded to achieve PIR with minimum cPoP.
In this paper, we make progress towards answering the last two questions and provide constructions of
efficient PIR schemes for querying MDS coded data. Specifically, we make the following contributions:
(i) For b = 1, i.e., no colluding nodes, we construct a linear PIR scheme with cPoP = 11−R (R = k/n
is the code rate), thus achieving the lower bound on cPoP for linear schemes in [10], [26] as m→∞;
(ii) For 2 ≤ b ≤ d − 1, we construct linear PIR schemes with cPoP = b + k; (iii) More generally, for
b ≤ n− δk, δ = ⌊n−bk ⌋, we construct linear PIR schemes with cPoP =
b+δk
δ . While the minimum cPoP
in this regime is unknown, the constructed schemes have a cPoP that does not depend on m, the number
of files in the system. An important property of the scheme for b = 1 is its universality. It depends only
on n, k, and b, but not on the generator matrix of the code. Moreover, both of these schemes can be
constructed for any given MDS code, i.e., it is not necessary to design the code jointly with the PIR
scheme. This implies that b does not have to be a rigid system parameter. Each user can choose their own
value of b to reflect its desired privacy level, at the expense of a higher cPoP . The DSS can serve all the
users simultaneously storing the same encoded data, i.e., without having to store different encodings for
different values of b. The construction in [27] is a generalized version of the earlier scheme presented
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TABLE I: The layout of the encoded symbols of the m files in the DSS.
here. In both schemes, the parity check matrix of the storage system should be known. The two schemes
perform equally well, and are in fact identical, for the case of no-collusion (b = 1) and for the case of
(n − k)-collusion (b = n − k). In the intermediate regime, the generalized scheme in [27] outperforms
our scheme.
II. MODEL
Distributed Storage Systems: Consider a distributed storage system (DSS) formed of n storage nodes
indexed from 1 to n. The DSS stores m files, X1, . . . ,Xm, of equal sizes. The DSS uses WLOG a
systematic1 (n, k, d) MDS code over GF (q) to store the data redundantly and achieve reliability against
d− 1 node failures. We assume that each file, Xi, i = 1, . . . ,m, is divided into α stripes, and each stripe
is divided into k blocks. We represent the file Xi = [xilj], l = 1, . . . , α, j = 1, . . . , k, as an α× k matrix,
with symbols from the finite field GF (qw). We divide the file into stripes to have the number of parts
of Xi be divisible by the number of queries and by the number of retrieved symbols per query.
Xi =


xi11 x
i
12 . . . x
i
1k
xi21 x
i
22 . . . x
i
2k
...
...
...
...
xiα1 x
i
k2 . . . x
i
αk


. (1)
1We focus on systematic codes due to their widespread use in practice. However, our results still hold for non-systematic
codes.
March 16, 2018 DRAFT
7Define X to be the mα× k matrix denoting all the systematic data in the system, i.e.,
X
mα×k
=


X1
X2
...
Xm


.
Each stripe of each file is encoded separately using the same systematic MDS code with a k × n
generator matrix Λ = [λij ] with elements in GF (q). Since the code is systematic, the square submatrix
of Λ formed of the first k columns is the identity matrix. The encoded data, XΛ, is stored on the DSS
as shown in Table I. We assume that the user knows this layout table, i.e., he/she knows the coding
coefficients for each node. We denote by wl ∈ GF (q
w)mα, l = 1, · · · , n the column vector representing
all the data on node l.
PIR: Suppose the user wants file Xf , where f is chosen uniformly at random from the set [m] =
{1, . . . ,m}. To retrieve file Xf , the user sends requests to the nodes, among which there are b colluding
nodes. The user does not know which nodes are colluding, else, he/she would avoid them. The goal is to
devise a PIR scheme that allows the user to decode Xf , while revealing no information, in an information
theoretic sense, about f to the nodes. The colluding nodes can analyze the different requests they receive
from the user in order to identify the requested file. However, as explained in the introduction, a node
has access to the requests coming to at most b− 1 other nodes in the system. Under this setting, we are
interested in linear PIR schemes.
Definition 1. A PIR scheme is linear over GF (q), and of dimension ρ, if it consists of the following two
stages.
1. Request stage: Based on which file the user wants, he/she sends requests to a subset of nodes in the
DSS. The request to node l takes the form of a ρ×mα query matrix Ql over GF (q).
2. Download stage: Node l responds by sending the projection of its data onto Ql, i.e.,
Rl = Qlwl ∈ GF (q
w)ρ. (2)
We think of each query matrix Ql as formed of ρ sub-queries corresponding to each of its ρ rows.
Moreover, we think of the response of node l as formed of ρ sub-responses corresponding to projecting
the node data on each row of Ql.
Definition 2 (Information theoretic PIR). A PIR scheme achieves (perfect) information theoretic PIR iff
H(f |Qj, j ∈ γ) = H(f), for all sets γ ∈ [n], |γ| = b. Here, H(·) denotes the entropy function.
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8The objective is to design a linear PIR scheme that (i) allows the user to decode its requested file Xf
and (ii) achieves information theoretic PIR with a low cPoP that does not depend on m. In the classical
literature on PIR, the communication cost includes both the number of bits exchanged during the request
and download stages. However, the query vectors depend only on the number of files in the system,
while the response vectors depend on the size of the files, i.e. for a single sub-query, the query vector
to a node consists of m symbols in GF (q) while the response vector from one node is 1 symbol in
GF (qw). In DSSs, and in the information-theoretic reformulation of this problem, the size of the files
are assumed to be arbitrarily large, thus making the number of the files negligible with respect to the
size of the files [10], i.e., w is much larger than m. Therefore, the download cost dominates the total
communication cost. Hence, we will only consider the download communication cost, which we will
refer to as the communication price of privacy (cPoP).
Definition 3. [cPoP] The communication Price of Privacy (cPoP) of a PIR scheme is the ratio of the
total number of bits sent from the nodes to the user during the download stage to size of the requested
file. This is the inverse of the PIR rate given in the literature.
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we state our two main results. The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Section IV-B, the
proof of Theorem 2 is given in Section V-B, and the proof of Theorem 3 is given in Section VI.
Theorem 1. Consider a DSS using an (n, k) MDS code over GF (q), with b = 1, i.e. no collusion
between the nodes. Then, the linear PIR scheme over GF (q) described in Section IV-A achieves perfect
PIR with cPoP = 11−R , where R = k/n.
The existence of PIR schemes over large fields that can achieve cPoP = 11−R for b = 1 follows from
Theorem 4 in [10]. The scheme in Section IV-A achieves the optimal cPoP given in [26] as m→ ∞.
We prove Theorem 1 by providing an explicit construction of the linear PIR scheme. The proposed PIR
construction is over same field over which the code is designed and is universal in the sense that it
depends only on the parameters n, k and b and not on the generator matrix of the code.
Theorem 2. Consider a DSS using an (n, k) MDS code over GF (q), with b colluding nodes, 2 ≤ b ≤
d− 1. Then, there exists an explicit linear PIR scheme over the same field that achieves perfect PIR with
March 16, 2018 DRAFT
9NOMENCLATURE
n Number of nodes in an (n, k, d) MDS code
k Dimension of the codeword in an (n, k, d) MDS code
d Distance of an (n, k, d) code
b Number of colluding nodes
m Number of files
ρ Dimension of the scheme, number of rounds / subqueries / rows in query matrix
r Remainder of the division of n− k by k
β Quotient of the division of n− k by k
α Number of subdivisions
u Random vector of size m
wl Data on node l
ef Indicator vector, the all-zero vector with one 1 in position f
ql,i Query vector to Node l in sub-query i
rl,i Response vector from Node l in sub-query i
Ql Query Matrix to Node l of dimension ρ×mα
El 0-1 matrix of dimension ρ×mα
cPoP = b+ k.
The next result is a generalization of Theorem 2 in which we describe a PIR scheme when b ≤ n−δk,
for any δ ≥ 1. Theorem 2 is a special case of Theorem 3 when δ = 1, but we keep it for a better
presentation of the proof. The optimal cPoP for PIR on coded data with colluding nodes is still an open
problem.
Theorem 3. For b ≤ n−δk colluding nodes, with δ = ⌊n−bk ⌋, we construct an explicit linear PIR scheme
with cPoP = b+δkδ .
To illustrate the performance stated in the above three theorems, the price of privacy versus the rate
of the storage code (R = kn ) when using the scheme of Theorem 1, the scheme of Theorem 2, and the
scheme for Theorem 3 for n = 16 and b = 1 is shown in Figure 2 . We notice that Theorem 1 shows
much improvement on Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 for b = 1. We can also see that Theorem 3 improves
on Theorem 2 when δ > 1.
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Fig. 2: cPoP versus rate following the scheme of Theorem 1, the scheme of Theorem 2, and the scheme for
Theorem 3 for n = 16 and b = 1
IV. PIR SCHEME CONSTRUCTION AND PROOF FOR b = 1
A. PIR scheme construction for b = 1
We describe here the PIR scheme referred to in Theorem 1. We assume WLOG that the MDS code is
systematic. The PIR scheme uses the number of stripes α = d− 1 and the dimension ρ = k.2 We write
α = βk + r where, β and r are integers and 0 ≤ r < k and β ≥ 0.
The scheme consists of the user sending a ρ×mα query matrix Ql to each node l, l = 1, . . . , n. To
form the query matrices, the user generates a ρ × mα random matrix U = [uij ], whose elements are
chosen uniformly at random from GF (q), the same field over which the MDS code is defined. The query
matrices have the following structure:
Ql = U + Ef,l, l = 1, . . . , n− r, (3)
Ql = U, l = n− r + 1, . . . , n. (4)
U is the random component of the query aimed at confusing the nodes about the request, whereas Ef,l
is a deterministic matrix that depends on the index f of the requested file. The matrices Ef,l add parts of
the file Xf that is being retrieved to the responses of the nodes. The user can download n− k symbols
2The parameters can be optimized to α = LCM(k,d−1)
k
and ρ = LCM(k,d−1)
d−1
, as was done in Example 1. But to simplify
notation, we will take α = d− 1 and ρ = k.
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1 2 3 4
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4
k
1 1 1 1
5 2 2 2 2
6 3 3 3 3
7 4 4 4 4
8
k
1 1 1 1
9 2 2 2 2
10 3 3 3 3
11
k
4
k
4 4 4
TABLE II: Example of the retrieval pattern for (n, k, d) = (15, 4, 12). The α× n entries of the table correspond
to the α × n coded symbols of the wanted file. All entries with same number, say j (also given the same color)
are privately retrieved in the jth sub-query. Note that there are k = 4 nodes, including the last r = 3 nodes, in
every sub-query, that do not have any retrieved symbols. The responses of these nodes are used to decode the
“interference” from all the files, needed to confuse the nodes about what is being requested. This interference is
then cancelled out from the other sub-responses in order to decode the desired file symbols in each sub-query.
privately per sub-query, so the matrices Ef,l add a symbol to the responses of n − k of the nodes per
sub-query. In this scheme, the user retrieves r symbols from the systematic nodes, and βk symbols from
the parity nodes. Moreover, the retrieved symbols should not be redundant. The matrices Ef,l are 0-1
matrices of dimensions ρ ×mα, every row corresponds to a sub-query and every column corresponds
to a stripe of a file. A “1” in the (i, j)th position of Ef,l implies that, during the i
th sub-query, the jth
symbol on node l is being retrieved privately. The matrices Ef,l are designed such that the following
conditions hold:
1) Each row and column of the matrices Ef,l contains at most one 1. The restriction on rows guarantees
that we receive one coded symbol from a node, instead of the sum of several symbols. The column
condition ensures that every symbol is only retrieved once, and thus, no retrieved symbol is redundant.
2) In each sub-query a 1 is added to the queries of exactly n− k nodes, i.e., for n− k of the matrices
Ef,l the i
th row contains a 1. This allows the user to decode a codeword from the MDS storage
code, since k symbols are not altered, and subsequently decode n− k symbols of the file Xf .
3) If j is the index of a stripe of the requested file f then exactly k of the matrices Ef,l contain a 1 in
column j. This ensures that we retrieve exactly k MDS coded symbols per row, which are needed
to recover the original stripe.
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Based on these desired retrieval patterns, we choose
Ef,1 =

0k×(f−1)α
Ir×r
0k×βk 0k×(m−f)α
0(k−r)×r

 , (5)
and Ef,l, l = 2, . . . , k, is obtained from matrix Ef,l−1 by a single downward cyclic shift of its row
vectors.
We divide the first βk parity nodes into β groups of k nodes each. All nodes in group s, i.e., nodes l
where sk + 1 ≤ l ≤ sk + k, receive the same query matrix, such that
Ef,l=
[
0k×(f−1)α+r+(s−1)k Ik×k 0k×(β−s)k+(m−f)α
]
. (6)
For the remaining r parity nodes we let
Ef,l = 0 , for l > βk + k,
and they hence all receive the same matrix U as a query.
Claim 1. Conditions 1, 2, and 3 are satisfied in the choice of the Ef,l above.
Proof. 1) Ef,l has at most one 1 in each row and column.
2) For the matrices Ef,l sent to the parity nodes, all βk of them contain exactly one 1 in row i.
Since the k matrices Ef,l for 1 ≤ l ≤ k sent to the systematic nodes are generated by cyclic row
shifts of the matrix in (5), and it contains exactly r rows with a single 1, we see that r of these
matrices contain a 1 in the ith row. In total we have βk + r = n− k matrices Ef,l that contain a 1
in their ith row.
3) The columns corresponding to the stripes of file f are in the range (f − 1)α < j ≤ fα. For
(f − 1)α < j ≤ (f − 1)α + r we see that the k matrices of the form (5) contain exactly one 1 in
column j. For (f − 1)α+ r+(s− 1)k < j ≤ (f − 1)α+ r+ sk, s = 1, · · · , β, the k matrices Ef,l,
for sk + 1 < l ≤ sk + k, contain each one 1 in column j.
Example 2 (Retrieval pattern). Consider a DSS using an (n, k, d) = (15, 4, 12) MDS code. Therefore,
we have ρ = k = 4 sub-queries to each node. Also, the number of stripes is α = d − 1 = 11. This
gives β = 2 and r = 3. Table II gives the retrieval pattern of the PIR scheme, i.e., which file symbols
are retrieved in each sub-query. The 11x15 entries in the table represents all the symbols of the desired
file with each node being a column. The numbers (alternatively colors) in each entry indicate in which
sub-query the specific symbol is retrieved.
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Sys. nodes
2 3 4 5
Parity nodes
S
tr
ip
es
1 1 2
2 1 1
3 2 2
TABLE III: Retrieval pattern for a (5,2,4) code.
Example 3 (Decoding). Now consider another example with (n, k, d) = (5, 2, 4) with generator matrix
Λ =

 1 0 1 1 1
0 1 1 2 3

, over GF (5). Suppose the DSS stores m = 3 files, X1,X2,X3. Our goal
is to construct a linear scheme that achieves perfect PIR against b = 1, with cPoP = 11−R =
5
3 . The
construction above gives α = d−1 = 3 and ρ = k = 2. Thus, a file Xi has the following array structure,
Xi =


xi11 x
i
12
xi21 x
i
22
xi31 x
i
32

 .
Therefore, we get β = 1 and r = 1. Suppose WLOG that the user wants file X1, i.e., f = 1. The user
generates an 2 × 9 random matrix U = [uij ], whose elements are chosen uniformly at random from
GF (5). For the nodes 1, . . . , 4, the query matrix Ql = U +E1,l, and Q5 = U . Therefore, following (3),
(4), (5), (6) and Table III we have
Q1 =

u11 + 1 u12 u13 u14 u15 u16 u17 u18 u19
u21 u22 u23 u24 u25 u26 u27 u28 u29

 ,
Q2 =

 u11 u12 u13 u14 u15 u16 u17 u18 u19
u21 + 1 u22 u23 u24 u25 u26 u27 u28 u29

 ,
Q3 =

u11 u12 + 1 u13 u14 u15 u16 u17 u18 u19
u21 u22 u23 + 1 u24 u25 u26 u27 u28 u29

 ,
Q4 =

u11 u12 + 1 u13 u14 u15 u16 u17 u18 u19
u21 u22 u23 + 1 u24 u25 u26 u27 u28 u29

 .
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The added 1s in certain positions of the query matrix are due to the addition of the matrix E1,l. This
construction achieves perfect privacy, since the only information any node l knows about f is through
the query matrix Ql, which is random and independent of f . Next, we want to illustrate how the user can
decode the file symbols. Each node l sends back the length 2 vector, rl = (rl1, rl2) = Qlwl, l = 1, . . . , 5,
to the user. Recall that wl is the data stored on node l. Consider the sub-responses of the 5 nodes to the
first sub-query. They form the following linear system:
x111 + I1 = r11 (7)
I2 = r21 (8)
x112 + x
1
22 + I1 + I2 = r31 (9)
x112 + 2x
1
22 + I1 + 2I2 = r41 (10)
I1 + 3I2 = r51, (11)
where Il = u
T
1 wl, l = 1, 2, and u
T
1 is the first row of U .
The user can first decode I1 and I2 from (8) and (11). Then, canceling out the values of I1 and I2
from the remaining equations, the user can solve for x111, x
1
12 and x
1
22. Similarly, the user can obtain
x121, x
1
13 and x
1
23 from the sub-responses to the second sub-query. This PIR scheme downloads 2 symbols
from each server. Therefore, it has a cPoP = 106 =
5
3 , which matches the bound in Theorem 1.
B. Proof of Theorem 1
The following remarks from coding theory will be used on several occasions. For more background
and proofs we refer to [33].
Remark 1. A linear [n, k] code C is the set of all vectors C := {xG : x ∈ Fkq} ⊆ F
n
q , where G is
a generator matrix of the code. Therefore C is a k dimensional subvectorspace of Fnq and any linear
combination of codewords in C is again a codeword in C .
Remark 2. The following statements are equivalent.
1) A [n, k] code C is MDS
2) For any generator matrix GC of C any k subset of columns is full rank.
3) The code C can recover from up to n− k erasures in any coordinates.
We prove Theorem 1 by showing that the scheme described in Section IV-A has the following
properties.
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Decodability: For any sub-query i, we sort the nodes into two groups to prove decodability. By the
properties of the Ef,l in Claim 1 exactly k nodes receive only the vector u
T
i , the i
th row of U , as a
query. And the user is aware of the indices of these nodes. For these nodes l, the received symbols are
given by
rli = u
T
i ·wl.
Since every stored stripe is a codeword in C , by Remark 1, any linear combination of stripes will be a
codeword too. We notice that rli is indeed the l
th component of the codeword r′i = u
T
i · (w1, . . . ,wn).
Since we have k of its components, we can recover the whole vector r′i by Remark 2.
For the other nodes ℓ, the ith sub-query is of the form uTi +eg where eg is a standard basis vector, i.e.,
a single 1 has been added to the vector ui in position g. The received symbol rℓi = u
T
i ·wℓ + eg ·wℓ =
uTi ·wℓ + wℓ(g) therefore is the sum of the ℓ
th component of r′i and the g
th symbol of wℓ. Since we
have recovered r′i from the k unaltered components, we can retrieve wℓ(g).
Furthermore, the matrices Ef,l are designed such that we retrieve exactly k symbols from every coded
stripe of the f th file. Using Remark 2 again allows us to retrieve all stripes of file Xf from these k
symbols.
Privacy: Since b = 1, the only way a node l can learn information about f is from its own query
matrix Qi. By, construction Qi is statistically independent of f and this scheme achieves perfect privacy.
cPoP: Every node l ∈ [n] responds with ρ = k symbols. Therefore, the total number of symbols
downloaded by the user is kn. Therefore, cPoP = knk(n−k) =
1
1−R .
V. PIR SCHEME CONSTRUCTION AND PROOF FOR b ≤ d− 1
A. PIR scheme construction for b ≤ d− 1
In this section, we will describe the general PIR scheme that achieves cPOP = b+k by specifying the
query matrices to each node. This scheme requires b ≤ d− 1. To simplify the description of the scheme,
we will assume b = d − 1.3 The scheme has dimension ρ = k, i.e., it consists of ρ = k sub-queries.
Moreover, the scheme requires no subdivisions, i.e., the number of stripes α = 1. Since there are no
subdivisions, we simplify further the notation and write xji1 = x
j
i to denote the i
th systematic symbol of
file Xj , where j = 1, . . . ,m. Denote by f the index of the file that the user wants, i.e., the user wants
to retrieve file Xf . WLOG, we assume the MDS code is systematic.
In the ith sub-query, i = 1, . . . , k, the proposed PIR scheme retrieves systematic symbol xfi of the
wanted file Xf . So, by the completion of the scheme, the user will have all the k symbols forming the
3If b < d− 1, only b+ k nodes, say the first b+ k, are queried.
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file. In sub-query i, the user creates d − 1 random (column) vectors u1,i, . . . ,ud−1,i, of dimension m
each, whose elements are chosen uniformly at random from GF (q). Recall that the generator matrix for
any systematic (n, k, d) MDS code is of the form
G
k×n
=
[
Ik×k Pk×(d−1)
]
, (12)
where P is a k × d − 1 matrix describing the parity nodes. A parity check matrix for this code is then
given by
H
(d−1)×n
=
[
−P T I(d−1)×(d−1)
]
.
Define Ui to be the m× (d− 1) matrix with its columns being the b = d− 1 random vectors used in
sub-query i, i.e.,
Ui
m×d−1
= [u1,i,u2,i, . . . ,ud−1,i] .
Now for each sub-query the user generates m random codewords in the dual code by multiplying the
random matrix Ui ∈ GF (q)
m×(d−1) by the parity check matrix H
(d−1)×n
to calculate
Ui H
(d−1)×n
=
[
q′1,i, . . . ,q
′
n,i
]
.
Note that each row of UiH is a codeword in the dual of the MDS code used to store the data.
For i = 1, . . . , k, let ql,i be the i
th sub-query vector to node l with l = 1, . . . , n. These query vectors
are chosen as follows:
ql,i =


q′l,i + ef , if l = i,
q′l,i, otherwise,
(13)
where ef is the standard basis vector with a single 1 in position f .
Therefore, the response of node l to the ith sub-query, denoted by rl,i, is given by (2) and can be
written as
rl,i = ql,i
Twl, (14)
where wl is the vector representing the data stored on node l.
We will give an example.
Example 4. Next, we illustrate this scheme through an example. Consider a DSS using the following
systematic (5, 3, 3) MDS code with generator matrix
Λ =


1 0 0 1 1
0 1 0 1 2
0 0 1 1 3

 .
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Suppose the system is storing m = 3 files, X1 =


a1
a2
a3

, X2 =


b1
b2
b3

 and X3 =


c1
c2
c3

. Then, the
data is stored on the different nodes in the DSS as described in table IV.
node 1 node 2 node 3 node 4 node 5
a1 a2 a3 a1 + a2 + a3 a1 + 2a2 + 3a3
b1 b2 b3 b1 + b2 + b3 b1 + 2b2 + 3b3
c1 c2 c3 c1 + c2 + c3 c1 + 2c2 + 3c3
TABLE IV: (5,3,3) DSS
Our goal is to construct a linear scheme that achieves perfect PIR against b = 2 colluding nodes with
cPoP = k + b = 3 + b. The scheme will consist of ρ = k = 3 sub-queries.
Suppose WLOG that the user wants file X1, i.e., f = 1. We will consider the first sub-query and the
remaining sub-queries (i.e. sub-queries 2 and 3) follow similarly. The user creates 2 random vectors
u1,1,u2,1 of dimension m = 3 each. U1 = [u1,1,u2,1]. The dual code will have a generator matrix
H
(n−k)×n
=

 −1 −1 −1 1 0
−1 −2 −3 0 1

 .
The sub-query vectors to nodes 1 to 5 are the following respectively
q1,1 = −u1,1 − u2,1 +


1
0
0

 , (15)
q2,1 = −u1,1 − 2u2,1, (16)
q3,1 = −u1,1 − 3u2,1, (17)
q4,1 = u1,1, (18)
q5,1 = u2,1. (19)
Next, we want to show that the user can decode its requested file correctly. The nodes send back the
length 3 vectors, rl = (rl,1, rl,2, rl,3), l = 1, . . . , 5, to the user. Consider the first symbol in each of the
vectors rl,1, which form the following linear system:
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node 1 node 2 node 3 node 4 node 5 node 6
a1 b1 a1 + b1 a1 + 2b1 a1 + 3b1 a1 + 4b1
.
..
.
..
.
..
.
..
.
..
.
..
am bm am + bm am + 2bm am + 3bm am + 4bm
TABLE V: (6,2,5) DSS
a1 − I11 − I12 = r1,1 (20)
−I21 − 2I22 = r2,1 (21)
−I31 − 3I32 = r3,1 (22)
I11 + I21 + I31 = r4,1 (23)
I12 + 2I22 + 3I32 = r5,1 (24)
where Ilj = u
T
j,1wl, for l = 1, 2, 3 denoting the node index, and j = 1, 2 denoting the random
vector. In analogy with the interference alignment literature [34], [35], one can think of a1 as the signal
to be decoded and I11, I12, I21, I22, I31, I32 as the interference. And we can notice that if we sum up
eqs. (20) to (24), we get a1. This PIR scheme downloads 3 packets from each server. Therefore, it has a
cPoP = 5×33 = 5.
As mentioned for b < d − 1 only b + k nodes are queried as shown in the next example. We will
revisit this example in the next section and present a more efficient scheme when explaining Theorem 3.
Example 5. Consider the (6,2,5) MDS code in table V, where Λ =

 1 0 1 1 1 1
0 1 1 2 3 4

. The goal
here is to construct a linear scheme that achieves perfect PIR against b = 2 colluding nodes with
cPoP = k+b = 4. Assume WLOG the user wants file Xf . The scheme will consist of ρ = 2 sub-queries.
We will consider the first sub-query and the second sub-query follows similarly.
In this case, the user will query only 4 nodes, WLOG the first 4 nodes, with generator matrix G =
 1 0 1 1
0 1 1 2

. As described in section V-A, the user creates 2 random vectors u1,1,u2,1 of dimension
m each, and as in the previous example, forms U1 = [u1,1,u2,1]. The dual code of G will have a generator
matrix
H
(n−k)×n
=

 −1 −1 1 0
−1 −2 0 1

 .
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The sub-query vectors to nodes 1 to 4 are the following respectively
q1,1 = −u1,1 − u2,1 + ef , (25)
q2,1 = −u1,1 − 2u2,1, (26)
q3,1 = u1,1, (27)
q4,1 = u2,1. (28)
(29)
The nodes will respond to the user by projecting their data on the query matrices. With inspection of
the queries, we can see that the user will be able to decode af from the first sub-query, and similarly
decode bf from the second sub-query. This achieves a cPoP = 4.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
We prove Theorem 2 by showing that the scheme described in Section V-A ensures decodability and
privacy. The main ingredient in the proof, which makes it different from the proof of Theorem 1, is that
the scheme does not require the user to decode all the interference terms. Recall that the user wants to
retrieve file Xf . We will prove that the user can retrieve xfi in the i
th sub-query. An alternative proof of
Theorem 2 is shown in the Appendix (Section IX).
Decodability:
The response of node l = 1, . . . , n to the ith sub-query is given by
rl,i = ql,i
Twl. (30)
To decode xfi , the user sums the responses of all the nodes to the i
th sub-query, i.e., it computes
∑n
l=1 rl,i.
Claim 2.
∑n
l=1 rl,i = x
f
i
Proof.
n∑
l=1
rl,i = tr ((UiH)
T
XG) + eTf wi (31)
= tr (UiHG
T
X
T ) + xfi (32)
= xfi . (33)
where tr(·) is the trace operator. Equation (31) follows directly from the scheme, equation (32) follows
from the fact that tr(ATB) = tr(ABT ), and equation (33) follows from the fact that tr (UiHG
T
X
T ) = 0
since HGT = 0.
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Privacy: Recall that f ∈ [m] is the index of the file wanted by the user. Let Sb be a subset of cardinality
b of [n] representing the set of b colluding nodes. We define QSb to be the set of query vectors (or
matrices) incoming to the b nodes indexed by Sb. We want to show that when b spies collude, they
cannot learn any information about f , i.e., H(f |QSb) = H(f), for any possible set of colluding nodes
Sb ⊂ [n], |Sb| = b.
H(f,QSb) = H(f,QSb) (34)
H(QSb) +H(f |QSb) = H(f) +H(QSb |f) (35)
H(f |QSb) = H(f) +H(QSb |f)−H(QSb) (36)
= H(f)−H(QSb) +H(QSb |f)
−H(QSb |f, Ui)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
(37)
= H(f)−H(QSb) + I(QSb , Ui|f) (38)
= H(f)−H(QSb) +H(Ui|f)
−H(Ui|QSb , f) (39)
= H(f)−H(QSb) +H(Ui) (40)
= H(f). (41)
Where the equality in equation (37) follows from the fact thatH(QSb |f, Ui) = 0, since the query vectors
are a deterministic function of f and Ui. Equation (40) follows from H(Ui|f) = H(Ui), since the random
matrix Ui is independent of the file index f . Moreover, H(Ui|QSb , f) = 0 since by (49), given f , Ui
can be decoded from QSb due to the MDS property of the code. Lastly, in (41) H(QSb) = H(Ui) = m
follows again from (49) and the MDS property of the code.
VI. PIR SCHEME CONSTRUCTION FOR b ≤ n− δk
Let δ = ⌊n−bk ⌋. We can see that for δ = 1, this simplifies to Theorem 2. Figure 3 shows a comparison
of the construction of Theorem 2 and Theorem 3.
Example 6. Consider again the (6,2,5) MDS code in table V and b = 2. We notice that in example 5,
we did not use nodes 5 and 6, and achieved cPoP = 4. Now we will show how we can use those nodes
and achieve a lower cPoP = 3. Assume the user wants file Xf .
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Fig. 3: cPoP versus rate when n = 16 and number of colluding nodes b = 1, 3, 5, following the scheme in
Theorem 2 and Theorem 3. We notice that as the number of colluding nodes increases, the improvement the
scheme in Theorem 3 has over the scheme in Theorem 2 grows.
We first choose the last b = 2 of the parity nodes to be common nodes. Then, we split the rest of
the δk = 4 nodes into δ = 2 groups of k = 2 nodes each. We then consider the two punctured codes,
each with a 2× 4 generator matrix, that intersect in the common nodes. Here, we pick the two subcodes
consisting of nodes 1, 2, 5, 6 and 3, 4, 5, 6, respectively. The punctured codes will have the following
generator matrices:
G1 =
[
B1 P
]
=

 1 0 1 1
0 1 3 4

 ,
and
G2 =
[
B2 P
]
=

 1 1 1 1
1 2 3 4

 .
The user can transform the generator matrices of the punctured codes into systematic form by multi-
plying by the inverse of the k× k = 2× 2 matrix formed by the non-common nodes. In this example, we
can see that G2 in not in systematic form, so we multiply by the inverse of the 2× 2 sub-matrix formed
by nodes 3 and 4, i.e.

 1 1
1 2

 to get
G2 =

 1 0 −1 −2
0 1 2 3

 .
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The parity check matrices of the (4, 2, 3) MDS codes generated by G1, and G2 are
H1 =
[
−P T1 I2×2
]
=

 −1 −3 1 0
−1 −4 0 1

 ,
H2 =
[
−P T2 I2×2
]
=

 1 −2 1 0
2 −3 0 1

 .
In this example, we will not subdivide the files into stripes, and one sub-query is required in which we
will decode both parts of the file. For this reason, we will remove the subscript for simplicity. Similar to
the scheme in section V-A, the user generates 2 random (column) vectors u1 and u2, of length m each,
whose elements are chosen uniformly at random from GF (q). Define U to be the m× 2 matrix with its
columns being the b = 2 random vectors u1 and u2, i.e.,
U
m×2
=
[
u1 u2
]
.
Now the user generates m random codewords in the dual codes by multiplying the random matrix U
by the parity check matrix H1
b×(b+k)
to calculate
UH1 =
[
q′1,q
′
2,u1,u2
]
, (42)
and multiplying the random matrix U by the parity check matrix H2
b×(b+k)
to calculate
UH2 =
[
q′3,q
′
4,u1,u2
]
, (43)
The query vectors to nodes 1, 2, 3, and 4 are chosen as follows:
ql =


q′l + ef , if l = 1 mod k,
q′l, otherwise.
(44)
The query vectors to nodes 5, 6 are
ql = ul. (45)
Decodability:
Each of the punctured codes is coded as in section V-A. Based on the decodability proved in section V-B,
the user can decode af from the first code, and af + bf from the second code. Hence, the user retrieves
file Xf .
Privacy:
The queries are sent by projecting the random matrix U on the matrix
H =
[
−P T1 −P
T
2 I
]
.
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This is a dual of the code generated by the matrix
G =

 B1 0 P
0 B2 P

 .
The dual code is an (6, 4, 3) MDS code, and thus the queries are sent using a (6, 2, 5) MDS code.
This means that any 2 queries are linearly independent and thus if this is private against 2 colluding
nodes.
The user contacts 6 nodes, to download 2 information parts, thus the price of privacy of this is
cPoP = b+δkδ =
6
2 = 3.
A. General Proof of Theorem 3
We assume the user wants fileXf . Assume n = b+δk.4 The user uses the last b nodes, nδk+1, . . . , nδk+b
as common nodes. The rest of the nodes will be divided into δ groups, j = 1, . . . , δ, of k nodes each.
This forms δ punctured (b+k, k) MDS codes, each with a generator matrix
[
Bj Pb×b
]
which can be
transformed to systematic form Gj =
[
Ik×k Pj
]
by multiplying by the inverse of the k × k matrix
Bj . Here we will use α = δ subdivisions and k queries.
5
We calculate the parity check matrix of the δ codes.
Hj
b×(b+k)
=
[
−P Tj Ib×b
]
.
Now for each sub-query, i, i = 1, . . . , k, the user generates m random codewords by multiplying the
random matrix Ui =
[
u1,i . . . ub,i
]
∈ GF (q)m×b by the parity check matrix Hj
b×(b+k)
of subcode j
Ui Hj
b×(b+k)
=
[
q′1+(j−1)k,i,q
′
2+(j−1)k,i . . . ,q
′
jk,i,u1,i, . . . ,ub,i
]
.
For the nodes l = 1, . . . , δk, the query vectors in sub-query i are as follows:
ql,i =


q′l,i + e(f−1)δ+j , if l = k − (j − 1) + i,
q′l,i, otherwise.
(46)
For the nodes l = δk + 1, . . . , δk + b, the query vectors in sub-query i are the columns of Ui
ql,i = ul−δk,i. (47)
4If b < n− δk, only b+ δk nodes are queried.
5 The parameters can be optimized to α = LCM(δ,k)
k
and ρ = LCM(δ,k)
δ
, as was done in Example 6. But to simplify notation,
we will take α = δ and ρ = k.
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Decodability:
For each subcode j, we follow the scheme of Theorem 2 to obtain the jth stripe of file xf . Subsequently,
the user is able to decode the file xf .
Privacy: The queries are generating by multiplying the random matrix U on the matrix
H =
[
−P T1 −P
T
2 · · · −P
T
δ I
]
.
This is a dual of the code generated by the matrix
G =


B1 0 · · · 0 P
0 B2 · · · 0 P
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 · · · Bδ P


.
We see that the code generated by G is an (δk+ b, δk, b+1) MDS code, and thus the queries are sent
using an (δk + b, b, δk + 1) MDS code.
This means that any b queries are linearly independent and thus this is private against b colluding
nodes.
The user contacts b + δk nodes, to download δ information parts, thus the price of privacy of this is
cPoP = b+δkδ .
VII. COMPARISON TO FUNDAMENTAL BOUNDS
Our scheme achieves the fundamental bounds currently known for infinite number of files and 1
spy node, i.e. no collusion. The lowest achievable price of privacy of a storage system with replicated
databases is given in [25] to be
1−(1/n)m
1−(1/n) which asymptotically approaches
n
n−1 as m→∞. If we apply
our PIR scheme for a replicated database, the cPoP = 11−R =
n
n−1 which is the limit of the lower bound.
The lower bound for an (n, k, d) MDS-coded database was derived in [26] to be 1−(k/n)
m
1−(k/n) , which
asymptotically approaches nn−k =
1
1−R as m→∞, and is again the cPoP achieved by our construction.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We studied the problem of constructing PIR schemes with low communication cost for requesting data
from a DSS that uses MDS codes. Some nodes in the DSS may be spies who will report to a third
party, such as an oppressive regime, which data is being requested by a user. The objective is to allow
the user to obtain its requested data without revealing any information on the identity of the data to the
nodes. We constructed PIR schemes against non-colluding nodes that achieve the information theoretic
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limit on the download communication cost for linear schemes. An important property of these schemes
is their universality since they depend on the code rate, but not on the MDS code itself. When there is
b-collusion with 2 ≤ b ≤ n− k, we devised linear PIR schemes that have download cost equal to b+ k
per unit of requested data.
IX. APPENDIX
A. Alternative Proof of Theorem 2
To simplify the description of the scheme, we will assume b = n − k. The scheme has dimension
ρ = k, i.e., it consists of ρ = k sub-queries. Moreover, the scheme requires no subdivisions, i.e., the
number of stripes α = 1. Since there are no subdivisions, we simplify further the notation and write
xji1 = x
j
i to denote the i
th systematic symbol of file Xj , where j = 1, . . . ,m. Denote by f the index of
the file that the user wants, i.e., the user wants to retrieve file Xf .
In the ith sub-query, i = 1, . . . , k, the proposed PIR scheme retrieves systematic symbol xfi of the
wanted file Xf . So, by the completion of the scheme, the user will have obtained all the k symbols
forming the file.
In sub-query i, the user creates b random (column) vectors u1,i, . . . ,ub,i, of dimension m each, whose
elements are chosen uniformly at random from GF (q). Define Ui to be the m× d − 1 matrix with its
rows being the b = n− k random vectors used in sub-query i, i.e.,
Ui
m×d−1
= [u1,i,u2,i, . . . ,ud−1,i] .
Recall that the generator matrix of the MDS code is
Λ
k×n
=

 Ik×k
λ1,k+1 . . . λ1,n
...
...
...
λk,k+1 . . . λk,n

 .
We write Λ =
[
I P
]
, where
P
k×d−1
=


λ1,k+1 . . . λ1,n
...
...
...
λk,k+1 . . . λk,n

 .
We denote by pTj the j
th row of P . Let eTf =
[
01×(f−1) 1 01×(m−f)
]
.
For a systematic node l, the user sends the sub-query vector:
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ql,i =


λl,k+1u1,i + · · · + λl,nud−1,i + ef , if l = i,
λl,k+1u1,i + · · · + λl,nud−1,i, otherwise.
(48)
This translates to
ql,i =


Uipl + ef , if l = i,
Uipl, otherwise.
(49)
For the parity nodes l = k + 1, . . . , n = k + b, the ith sub-query vector is given by,
ql,i = ul−k,i. (50)
Therefore, the response of node l to the ith sub-query, denoted by rl,i, is given by (2) and can be
written as
rl,i = ql,i
Twl, (51)
where wl is the vector representing the data stored on node l.
We prove Theorem 2 by showing that the scheme described in Section V-A ensures decodability and
privacy. The main ingredient in the proof, which makes it different from the proof of Theorem 1, is that
the scheme does not require the user to decode all the interference terms.
Recall that the user wants to retrieve file Xf . We will prove that the user can retrieve xfi in the i
th
sub-query.
Decodability:
From (49) and (56), the response of systematic node l to the ith sub-query is given by
rl,i =


pTl U
T
i wl + x
f
i = w
T
l Uipl + x
f
i if l = i,
pTl U
T
i wl = w
T
l Uipl otherwise.
(52)
Notice that wTl Ui
Tpl is the l
th diagonal element of XUi
TP T , sincewl is the l
th row of X, l = 1, . . . , k,
due to the assumption that the MDS code is systematic. Thus, the vector representing all the responses
of the systematic nodes to the ith sub-query can be written as follows,

r1,i
r2,i
...
rk,i


= diag(XTUiP
T ) +


0i−1×1
xfi
0k−i×1

 , (53)
where diag(·) is the diagonal of the corresponding matrix.
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Denoting by p′j the j
th column of P , the response of parity node l, l = k + 1, . . . , n, can be written
as
rl,i = u
T
l−k,iwl (54)
= wTl ul−k,i (55)
= p′
T
l−kX
Tul−k,i, (56)
where (56) follows from the fact that the coded data stored on parity node l can be written aswl = p
′T
l−kX.
Thus, similarly to (53), we can write all the responses of the parity nodes in vector form as

rk+1,i
rk+2,i
...
rn,i


= diag(P TXTUi
T ). (57)
Next, we want to show that xfi can be decoded as follows,
xfi =
k∑
l=1
rl,i −
k+b∑
l=k+1
rl,i.
Indeed, we have
k∑
l=1
rl,i = tr(X
TUiP
T ) + xf1 (58)
= tr(P TXTUi) + x
f
1 (59)
=
b∑
l=1
rl+k,i + x
f
1 (60)
=
k+b∑
l=k+1
rl,i + x
f
1 , (61)
where tr(·) is the trace operator, (58) follows from (53), (59) follows from the trace property, tr(ABC) =
tr(CAB), and (60) follows from (57).
This means that the responses of the systematic nodes and those of the parity nodes cancel out to
leave the part required, i.e., xfi . Therefore, we showed that in the i
th, i = 1, . . . , k sub-query, the user
can decode xfi and by the completion of the k
th sub-query the user would have obtained the whole file
Xf .
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